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Abstract 
The aim of a clinical decision support tool is to reduce the complexity of clinical decisions. 
However, when decision support tools are poorly implemented they may actually confuse 
physicians and complicate clinical care. This paper argues that information from decision 
support tools is often removed from the clinical context of the targeted decisions. Physicians 
largely depend on clinical context to handle the complexity of their day-to-day decisions. 
Clinical context enables them to take into account all ambiguous information and patient 
preferences. Decision support tools that provide analytic information to physicians – without its 
context – may then complicate the decision process of physicians. It is likely that the joint forces 
of physicians and technology will produce better decisions than either of them exclusively: after 
all, they do have different ways of dealing with the complexity of a decision and are thus 
complementary. Therefore, the future challenges of decision support do not only reside in the 
optimization of the predictive value of the underlying models and algorithms, but equally in the 
effective communication of information and its context to doctors.  
Introduction 
Prediction models in health care estimate patient-specific risks of current or future conditions in 
new patients. By presenting patient-specific risk predictions to physicians, prediction models 
provide personalized decision support that aims to improve clinical decision making.1,2 However, 
the evidence indicating that such decision support tools improve the quality of clinical decision 
making and patient outcome, remains highly inconsistent.3–7 Current literature on clinical 
decision support suggests that adding therapeutic recommendations to the risk predictions will 
improve the effectiveness of the decision support tool.6–8 The patient-specific risk prediction is 
merely a single factor in a highly complex decision making process. Consequently, the addition 
of a recommendation to the risk prediction may provide the clinical context that is required to 
make a personalized decision for an individual patient.6,9  
 
In a recent series of studies, Kappen et al. added therapeutic recommendations to risk predictions 
of postoperative nausea and vomiting, which improved both the decision making of physicians 
and patient outcome.9–11 Despite the improved effectiveness of the decision support tool, 
physicians did not comply with the recommendations in 34% of their patients, and many patients 
still suffered from nausea and vomiting after their surgical procedure. One explanation would be 
that the physicians took individual patient factors into account such as patient comorbidities or 
even patient preferences, and deliberately decided not to comply with the recommendations in 
34% of their patients. An alternative explanation would be that the addition of recommendations 
did not provide the physicians with sufficient insight to value the recommendations for 
individual patients. The physicians could not decide whether the recommendation was either 
right or wrong, because in their view that depends entirely on the clinical context. Simply 
presenting more information to physicians is not the same as placing the information from the 
decision support tool within the clinical context – or contextualizing the decision support tool. In 
this article we will first argue that most current decision support tools are decontextualized. We 
then discuss how physicians rely on clinical context to handle the complexity of a clinical 
situation. Finally, we will argue that because of this complexity, decision support tools that 
contextualize predictions will be more effective in supporting physicians in decision making. 
Decision support 
‘Clinical decision support’ generally refers to electronic systems that aim to help physicians 
make better clinical decisions, which in turn should improve the outcome of their patients.12 The 
concept here is similar to that of physician decision making: decision support uses individual 
patient and disease characteristics to provide physicians with patient-specific risk predictions or 
risk-based recommendations on treatment or diagnostic testing.6,13 The predictions and 
recommendations may help physicians to analyze and manage the complexity of decision 
situations and reduce the cognitive workload of their decision making.6,14 Current literature 
suggests that, for optimal effectiveness, decision support needs to blend in with the process of 
routine care and the presented predictions and recommendations should be embedded in the 
clinical context.5,6,15–17 Contextualized decision support then minimizes the attentional resources 
that are required from physicians to interpret and use the predictions and recommendations in 
their decisions.  
However, these claims seem to be largely unfounded, as decision support has failed to 
demonstrate that it improves patient outcome on a large scale.5,18,19 From the theory of 
sociotechnical systems we know that the interaction between physicians and decision support 
tools will produce both ‘designed’ and ‘unintended’ changes in the existing decision making 
routines of physicians.2,20–22 Such unintended consequences can paradoxically increase the 
cognitive workload of physicians or prevent the decision support from having a beneficial effect 
on patient outcome.1,2 This does not mean that we should question the need for contextualized 
decision support. On the contrary, the unintended changes in decision routines and the inability 
to improve patient outcome indicate that many decision support tools are still decontextualized 
and do not necessarily manage complexity as well as they aim to.   
Decision complexity 
A decision becomes complex when the outcome of the decision is difficult to predict, despite the 
fact that one is reasonably informed about the individual components of the decision and their 
interrelations.23 From this rather abstract definition we can establish that the level of complexity 
of a decision is not simply determined by the number of components and interrelations that are 
involved in a decision. Rather, the complexity depends on the (un)predictability of the effects of 
a decision from the components and interrelations that are known at the time of decision making. 
Consequently, in addition to the information that is available to the physicians, we also need to 
consider the information that the physicians are missing. 
The available information 
A basic decision on a medical intervention requires at least three pieces of clinical information: 
(1) the future risk of harm from the natural course of the disease (i.e. the prognosis); (2) the 
expected benefit from the intervention (i.e. the effectiveness); and (3) the nature and likelihood 
of harm from the intervention (side effects or complications). When these three informational 
components are exactly known for an individual patient the decision is relatively simple. It is a 
choice between two prognoses: either the risk of harm from the disease -- or the reduced risk of 
the disease after treatment, even after factoring the harms of the intervention. Since it is clear 
how the decision will affect outcome, the patient can weigh the two options according to his or 
her personal preferences and come to a decision.  
Such a clear-cut decision situation is merely hypothetical. Even for the simplest clinical 
decision the exact risks and benefits are not known for an individual patient and can only be 
approximated by probability estimations. There are three major methods for acquiring medical 
knowledge that a physician can use to estimate the probabilities for an individual patient: clinical 
research, pathophysiologic understanding, and clinical experience.24,25 It is important to note that 
these methods do not necessarily have to estimate the probability in a quantitative way. To 
estimate the probabilities of risks and benefits for an individual patient, the knowledge that is 
acquired through each method has to be made patient-specific. This requires specific 
characteristics of the individual patient and the current disease state -- i.e. the clinical context -- 
such as the patient’s demographics, lifestyle factors, results of diagnostic testing and 
comorbidity. The complexity of a clinical decision then becomes apparent. Many of these 
variables are interrelated, e.g. diagnostic testing depends on signs and symptoms, signs and 
symptoms may depend on comorbidity, etc. The greater the number of variables comprised in the 
clinical context, the greater number of interrelations will be involved. Further, each probability 
estimate for either a risk or an expected benefit is likely to be based on all three of above 
mentioned methods of knowledge acquisition, whereas all these methods use many of the same 
patient and disease variables. This greatly increases the number of possible interrelations in the 
decision. Even a basic medical decision is thus easily complicated by its clinical context. 
The missing information: uncertainty and ambiguity 
Notwithstanding the amount of information that is involved in the decision, it would still be 
possible to estimate the probabilities of risks and benefits for an individual patient when all the 
variables and interrelations are exactly known. It would be quite an undertaking for a physician -
- although not insuperable -- whereas it would be very easy for a decision support tool. However, 
in most decision situations the variables and interrelations are not exactly known -- there is 
missing information. Most diseases do not manifest themselves through textbook signs and 
symptoms, patients do not always report all aspects of their lifestyle, and most diagnostic tests do 
not have a perfect predictive value. Accordingly, in many clinical decisions complexity truly 
complicates decision making.  
How much the missing information increases the complexity of a decision depends on 
what part of the information is not available. When one knows that a particular variable or one of 
the interrelations is involved in a decision, but we do not know its exact value, the information 
may either be uncertain or ambiguous. Uncertainty means that we are informed about the value 
but it lacks precision† -- i.e. only the probability distribution of a variable or interrelation is 
known.26–28 An imperfect diagnostic test is a good example of uncertainty, as we do know the 
probability of a diagnosis from the predictive value of the test, but we do not know whether in 
this instance the test is correct. Although uncertainty definitely adds to the complexity of a 
decision, with the right information it is still possible to calculate a probability estimate for the 
 
† Precision in this instance does not refer to the statistical terminology of ‘precision’ and 
‘accuracy’, as at the time of decision making one cannot distinguish between a random or 
systematic error for a single value. 
risks and benefits for an individual patient. The uncertainty in the variables and interrelations 
then results in uncertainty of the probability estimates for risks and benefits. A decision support 
tool is able to calculate the probability estimates with relative ease, through the use of 
sophisticated statistics and machine learning algorithms. Nonetheless, even under uncertainty, a 
rational patient would still be able to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment in a quantitative 
way and come to a decision according to his preferences.  
Information is ambiguous when we understand the concept of the variable or the interrelation‡ 
(we may even know the set of possible values), but we do not know the probability or the 
distribution of those values -- at least not in a quantitative way.26–28 Ambiguity exists when a 
variable has multiple interpretations that coexist and may even oppose each other, or when its 
information is indistinct or ill-defined.26,27 Ambiguous variables and interrelations are ample in 
clinical decision situations, e.g., atypical signs and symptoms, or inter-observer differences for a 
diagnostic test. As a result of the ambiguity in variables and interrelations, the expected risks and 
benefits can no longer be quantified. Ambiguity thus greatly decreases the predictability of the 
effects of a decision on patient outcome, which makes it much more difficult for patients to 
weigh risks and benefits.  
Moreover, the preferences of patients -- or physicians -- are often ambiguous as well. For 
example, postoperative nausea and vomiting is very unpleasant for patients undergoing surgery 
and up to three different antiemetic drugs may need to be administered for effective  
prophylaxis,.29 Although the risk of serious adverse drug events is probably very low (below one 
 
‡ Note that when a variable or interrelation is unknown, its concept is not known and there is no information, it does 
not directly contribute to the complexity, as such a variable contains information that is missing but not information 
that is available. Such an unknown factor is more likely to be a cause of ambiguity or uncertainty. 
in one thousand), there is still a non-zero risk of a fatal cardiac arrhythmia or a serious infection 
of the surgical site. How does one value the risk of a fatal cardiac arrhythmia due to prophylactic 
treatment – even when its risk is one in one hundred thousand – against being nauseous and 
vomiting for 24 hours? Especially, when considering that the antiemetic drugs only reduce the 
risks of nausea and vomiting and cannot guarantee their prevention. Such ambiguity is more of 
an ‘ethical’ nature, in contrast to the more ‘technical’ ambiguity of the medical variables and 
interrelations.  
The ethical and technical ambiguity are also interrelated, as the difficulty for a patient to 
decide on such an ethical dilemma will depend on his or her ability to understand the risks and 
benefits that are presented by the physician. The complexity of a clinical decision is thus 
determined by the number of variables and interrelations that comprise the clinical context, the 
amount of uncertainty and ambiguity that is associated with them, and the ethical ambiguity of 
personal preferences. In the next sections, we will separately discuss the way that physicians and 
decision support tools handle complexity.  
Physicians and decision complexity 
Regardless of their complexity, clinical decisions will have to be made by patients and 
physicians. A good decision can only be made when all important elements -- variables, 
preferences, interrelations -- of the decision are considered, even when these elements are 
ambiguous. One strategy for physicians to handle the ambiguous elements in their decisions 
would be to somehow interpret and weigh the value of the elements. The estimated values for the 
ambiguous elements can then be used in the calculation of the probability estimates of risks and 
benefits. Nonetheless, the time and effort that would be required to weigh the value of all 
ambiguous elements and to analyze their interrelations with other decision elements would 
impose a far too great workload on a physician.30,31 
Instead of relying on the slow and more analytic type of reasoning -- also known as Type 
2 reasoning -- physicians rely on a faster and more intuitive type of reasoning -- known as Type 
1 reasoning -- to deal with everyday decision complexity.32–35 Type 1 reasoning uses experience-
based strategies for problem-solving – or heuristics – that allow people to judge frequencies or 
possibilities in a fast and frugal way.36  A physician will try to recognize the context of a 
complex decision, rather than try to understand the context and the complexity.21,37,38 A 
recognized context becomes a frame of reference for all relevant information that the physician 
has learned to associate with the context, such as typical and atypical signs and symptoms, 
diagnostic testing, treatment options, etc. As the context is recognized in an intuitive, imprecise 
yet reliable way, it allows physicians to accept the complexity of a decision as it is – 
contextualization of the decision situation thus simplifies the decision itself. It then becomes 
much easier to interpret specific elements of the decision, to reason on risks and benefits and to 
communicate clinical information to other healthcare workers and patients.39  
The ‘fuzzy’ recognition of complex patterns within the clinical context enables 
physicians to handle ambiguous information, which they may use in further analytic and 
reflective reasoning (Type 2 reasoning).39,40 Physicians also acquire additional contextual 
information to understand how clinical information was produced, e.g. knowing who performed 
a diagnostic test may be informative of its reliability.41 This production-contextual information 
may allow physicians to interpret otherwise ambiguous variables and weigh the value of those 
variables in their decisions. Contextualization of a decision situation thus provides a highly 
efficient heuristic for physicians to handle the complexity of clinical decisions while maintaining 
an acceptable workload.39,42 
Decision tools and decision complexity 
Decision support tools rely on the use of algorithms to provide risk-based predictions and 
recommendations. The algorithms may use any of the sources of medical knowledge to estimate 
the risks and benefits: clinical research, pathophysiologic understanding, and clinical experience. 
Today’s computers are so powerful that decision support tools that must quickly handle lots of 
data are no longer limited by processing power. It thus seems intuitive that decision support tools 
are well equipped to model risks and benefits for complex decision situations, as long as there is 
sufficient data to do the necessary calculations. However, as decision support tools use 
algorithmic approaches to model the risks and benefits, they require quantifiable variables and 
interrelations as inputs. They thus do not easily handle ambiguous information. The greater the 
amount of ambiguity in decision situations, the greater the need for heuristics, which allow 
physicians to consider all available information, including the ambiguous elements. 
Decision tools and physician interaction 
The predictions and recommendations from decision support tools may still be very useful to 
physicians, even when there is ambiguity involved. For decision support tools to be useful in 
ambiguous decision situations, they have to effectively communicate their risk-based predictions 
in such way that physicians will be able to weigh the predictions in their decision making. When 
a decision support tool only presents quantitative risk predictions, it communicates 
decontextualized and analytic information to physicians, who may find it quite difficult to 
integrate in their more heuristic decision making process.9 
The communication between a decision support tool and physicians is analogous to a 
native speaker who tries to communicate with a non-native speaker – as a decision tool can be 
considered ‘native’ in using probabilities and probability distributions. Even when the message is 
correctly phrased by the native speaker, it may require a lot of time and attention from the non-
native speaker to understand the message. The message may even be incorrectly understood by 
the non-native speaker. Without a proper context the predictions are thus likely to increase the 
workload of physicians,1,2 or may have an unintended negative effect on the quality of decisions 
– and may even result in a worse patient outcome.20–22 This would make physicians fall back on 
their clinical experience and thus rely more on heuristics.  
The difficulty to use the decontextualized predictions will prove greater for physicians 
when the decision complexity contains increased levels of ambiguity, as that would mean a 
greater gap between the predictions and the clinical context. Paradoxically, the more support a 
decision tool tries to provide in an ambiguous decision situation, the greater will be the risk of 
unintended changes in the physicians’ routines, such as loss of situational awareness or 
degradation of clinical experience.43 The negative consequences of a wrong decision on patient 
outcome are greater when a patient’s risk of harm is higher. In other words, when the stakes of a 
decision are higher, the impact of a wrong decision will be greater, which requires a greater need 
to rely on physician heuristics.  
Contextual decision support 
From the previous sections we may conclude that the need for physicians to rely on heuristics – 
rather than to trust computerized decision support – will be greater when: (a) there is a lot of 
ambiguity, (b) the stakes of the decision are high, and (c) the decision support poses too much 
extra workload. The goals of contextualizing a decision support tool thus are: to make the tool 
acknowledge and ‘factor in’ ambiguity; to provide risk-based support to physicians; and to keep 
(or make) the workload acceptable. In the next sections, we discuss three ways to contextualize 
the predictions of decision support tools: the algorithms of the model may be changed to include 
more complexity; decision support tools may be more flexible to changes in clinical context; the 
communicative capabilities of the tool may be improved. 
The complexity model 
One way to contextualize a decision support tool is to improve the algorithms that the tool uses 
to calculate the predictions for the decision situation. The goal of the improvement would be to 
model all complexity. However, the challenge for the future will be to understand how we should 
deal with ambiguity in the algorithms of decision support tools. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to discuss all available models and algorithms, or to speculate whether future artificial 
intelligence techniques will be able to handle ambiguity in a satisfactory way. Nevertheless, 
when ambiguity can be truly modeled by algorithms, the information is no longer ambiguous. A 
more promising approach is thus disambiguation of the decision, which will probably require 
specific research on the topic of the decision.  
Alternatively, improving the data quality on which the algorithms are based would be 
another strategy, as it will improve the predictions of risks and benefits, despite the residual 
ambiguity. When we consider the example of postoperative nausea and vomiting, which was 
mentioned in the introduction, we would choose disambiguation of the decision. The risk 
predictions of which patients will become nauseous after surgery as well as the effectiveness of 
prophylactic treatment have been extensively quantified, albeit with a fair amount of 
uncertainty.44–47 From the results of recent impact studies by Kappen et al., we started 
questioning whether there is an unquantified interrelation between the predicted risk and the 
effectiveness of treatment.48 Further study may help to solve the ambiguous relation between 
predictions and treatment, or how to predict which patients will respond to treatment. 
Nevertheless, when a larger part of complexity is modeled by the algorithm, there is also an 
increased risk of unintended consequences, such as unwanted changes in the decision making 
routines of physicians.  
Flexible heuristic space 
A flexible heuristic space refers to the ratio between the use of heuristics and the use of 
predictive information in the decision making process. This concept is similar to that of the level 
of automation that is used in ergonomics.43,49 The level of automation thus also depends on the 
stakes, the ambiguity, and the workload of the decision, as discussed in previous sections. 
Low ambiguity, low stakes. When the level of ambiguity and the stakes are both low or when 
they are both high, the choice will be the easiest. For an unambiguous decision for which the 
stakes are low, human involvement may be restricted to the minimum and the process may be 
fully automated if at all possible.  
High ambiguity, high stakes. High levels of ambiguity with very high stakes will require a fully 
autonomous physician, with the decision support tool functioning merely as an assisting 
instrument for information gathering and clinical reasoning. And perhaps – if properly designed 
and implemented -- it can also reduce the physician’s workload.  
Low ambiguity, high stakes. An unambiguous decision with high stakes poses a bigger 
challenge. As there is little ambiguity, it would make sense to let the decision support tool make 
the decisions to a great extent, with the physicians monitoring those decisions as the margin for 
error is small. Nonetheless, this situation is also prone to unintended effects of the decision 
support tool, as such a high level of automation may cause the physicians to lose situational 
awareness or degrade their clinical experience.43 There are numerous examples from aviation 
where automation-related incidents could be traced back to loss of situational awareness by the 
crew.50–52  It is thus not at all said that physicians will be able to keep the margin for error small 
when they are tasked with monitoring an almost fully automated process. As physicians will still 
be responsible for the final decision, it may prove more effective to lessen the level of 
automation. In fact, because the stakes are so high, the physicians may not even indulge such a 
high level of automation, especially when the decision support tool is perceived as 
counterproductive.18,53,54  
High ambiguity, low stakes. A similar problem may occur when the decision is highly 
ambiguous, but when the stakes are low. The amount of ambiguity implies a greater need for 
heuristics. However, physicians are limited by their workload capacity.35 Should this decision be 
the only problem that the physician faces at that moment, it would be highly efficient to simply 
let the physician make the decision, perhaps assisted by a computer. However, in a highly 
demanding environment, such as during surgery or treating a patient at the Intensive Care Unit, 
the physicians will not prioritize their attention to this relatively unimportant decision. In such an 
instance, it may be more efficient to let the decision support tool make a standardized 
recommendation, which directs the decision of the physician despite the presence of ambiguity. 
These are four distinct situations. In clinical practice this will be more of a continuum. It is 
important to note that the level of automation does not automatically follow from the level of 
ambiguity and the stakes of the decision. The level of automation has to be chosen when 
designing the decision support tool. The ambiguity and the stakes of the decision may indicate 
what the risks of automating a decision will be, not whether the risks are acceptable.  
Furthermore, the workload of the physicians in the decision situation at hand – from both 
the decision itself and other tasks and decisions – will determine how much time and attention 
can be additionally spent on using the decision support tool. In our example of postoperative 
nausea and vomiting, physicians had to make ambiguous decisions on preventive treatment in a 
high-workload environment for a problem that was not considered to be of utmost importance.9 
A higher level of automation – providing treatment recommendations that only required 
confirmation – was more effective than a lower level of automation, i.e. providing only risk 
predictions.10,11 However, the effects on decision making and patient outcome were still modest 
when the decision support tool provided treatment recommendations. Going to the next higher 
level of automation – perhaps even fully automated decision support – may further increase the 
effectiveness of the tool, but may also increase the risk of unintended negative effects. The 
decision to further automate a decision support tool for postoperative nausea and vomiting may 
thus depend on the willingness of patients to accept the increased risks for a possible reduction in 
discomfort from nausea and vomiting after surgery.  
Even within similar decision situations the level of ambiguity, the stakes and the 
workload may fluctuate. Ideally, the level of automation should be flexible, responding to these 
fluctuations. A future perspective might be that decision support tools do not only provide risk-
dependent predictions or recommendations, but its level of automation also depends on the 
predicted risks and the workload of physicians. In our example of postoperative nausea and 
vomiting, the decision support tool might be able to estimate the workload of the physician at 
any time point during the anesthetic case. A flexible decision support tool would then provide its 
predictions and recommendations when there is a low workload during the case. Alternatively, a 
flexible tool would adjust its level of automation when the workload becomes too high.  
Communicative capabilities 
In current literature many factors are reported that improve the capabilities of a decision support 
tool to communicate context to physicians together with its calculated predictions. The 
hypothesis is that this will free up the mind of physicians to pay more attention to other complex 
activities that are not covered by the decision support tool.55,56  
For example, the addition of actionable recommendations to risk predictions already aims 
to provide context on what a risk prediction may imply for treatment.6,8,10,11 Alternatively, the 
reasoning behind the predictions may be provided, including details about the variables on which 
the model is based, and what predictors dominate in a particular patient.6,15,18 This would 
facilitate physicians to better interpret the predictions and weigh them against their own clinical 
experience. Although there are several proven facilitators that improve the decision making of 
physicians, those interventions hardly incorporate ambiguity as a factor. As we argued in the 
section on ‘Decision support’, most decision support tools are still decontextualized. Ambiguity 
in clinical contexts causes information to be imprecise, thus true contextual decision support 
should not aim to provide precise information.22,57 Decision support tools would be truly 
supportive when they communicate to physicians in the language of the physicians, instead of 
their own technical language of probabilities. Decision support should merely provide a 
description, which is written in a natural language and should try to convey meaning instead of 
facts.  
When it is possible for a decision support tool to communicate ambiguous information to 
the physicians, the physicians would be able to enter a response to the decision support tool. As 
the decision support tool knows the quantitative meaning behind the otherwise ambiguous 
description that it provided to the physician, the tool may use the response for further 
calculations in self-learning algorithms. For example, the decision support tool may 
communicate that a patient has a high risk of postoperative nausea and vomiting and has no 
direct contraindications for preventive treatment. The physician may respond that he does not 
want to administer one of the possible drugs because the patient has several comorbidities. 
Although the decision support tool does not have to directly understand what the physician 
exactly means, the tool may learn in time to recognize patients which are considered to be too 
fragile by physicians to accept the risks of preventive treatment. When the decision support tool 
collected sufficient data on such patients it may either confirm or refute the risk and 
communicate that to the physicians. In this way, the algorithms of decision support may be able 
to include clinical intuition of physicians into their calculations. 
Patient preferences 
Similar communicative capacities of decision support tools may facilitate communication with 
patients, either directly with patients or through the physicians. Patients should be able and 
allowed to decide whether and how their diseases will be treated. It is a physician’s job to 
provide the patients with the right decision situation and decision options that are appropriate for 
the clinical context. The more complex the clinical context and the decision situation, the more 
difficult it will be to provide the right information and context to patients. Without context the 
predictions and recommendations of a decision support tool may not mean much to patients. 
Providing them with contextual information that is communicated in natural languages may 
improve the patients’ understanding of the decision situation. Such communication may be 
bidirectional. For example, rather than asking a patient to weigh a risk of one in one hundred 
thousand of a serious adverse event, to a risk of one in three of postoperative nausea and 
vomiting, it may be more useful to explore the preferences of patients and provide the context 
that they require. This may help patients to straighten out their thoughts on the decision, but also 
help physician to understand their patients. 
A decision support tool may use a patient’s input to select appropriate information about 
the clinical context and the decision situation, but the tool may also weigh patient preferences in 
its recommendations. Moreover, flexibility of a decision support tool may also be determined by 
patient preferences. After all, it is very common in (non-automated) clinical practice that patients 
express their preferences and priorities to their physicians. In our example, a flexible decision 
support tool for postoperative nausea and vomiting would draw more attention from a physician 
when the patient indicated that preventing nausea and vomiting was highly important to him. In 
other words, a flexible decision support tool would allow physicians to prioritize their time and 
attention according to patient preferences.  
Conclusion 
Clinical decision support aims to reduce the complexity of clinical decisions, yet if poorly 
implemented and used it may actually complicate care and confuse physicians. In this paper we 
argued that information from decision support tools is often removed from its clinical context. In 
contrast, physicians largely depend on clinical context to handle the complexity of their day-to-
day decisions. Simply offering analytic information to physicians – without its context – may be 
similar to trying to get two people who speak different languages to have an elaborate 
conversation.  
‘Believers’ of artificial intelligence argue that, since computers are much more capable to 
handle large amounts of information than humans, future elaborate decision support tools can 
replace physicians.58–60 Simply typing ‘Will computers replace doctors’ into Google yields 
millions of hits discussing the subject.§ However, information is not the same as knowledge.61 
Apart from the  non-technical skills patients expect from their doctor, future iDoctors and Doctor 
Algorithms would need to be able to handle clinical context and decision complexity to a similar 
– or even better – degree as physicians. Obviously, computers are more capable to handle large 
number of variables and estimate levels of uncertainty, but physicians have the unique skill to 
use and interpret – albeit imperfectly – the entire clinical context in their decisions, taking into 
 
§ At the time of writing, the search string ‘Will computers replace doctors’ without quotation marks yielded 
approximately 49,900,000 results when entered into Google. However, when the search string included quotation 
marks, it yielded only 1,410 results. Paradoxical to the conclusion of this paper, this is a nice example of artificial 
intelligence being able to handle context. 
account all ambiguous information and patient preferences. Instead of arguing about who is 
ultimately better at clinical decision making, it may prove to be a more profitable strategy to use 
the best of both worlds and let doctors arrive at optimal patient-centered therapeutic decisions 
using tools on their computers for probability estimation and other applications requiring 
hardcore number crunching. To improve the quality of decision support tools, designers should 
focus not only on predictive accuracy, but also on optimizing the way in which such probabilities 
and therapeutic recommendations are communicated to and interpreted by doctors. 
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